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Abstract 
There is a growing body of work on the ability of young people and minorities to have their 
voices heard in the public sphere, particularly with advances in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) and the emancipatory expectations that ensued. Are all young people, in 
all their diversity, equally likely to have their political claims relayed by the mainstream press? 
Is the growing prevalence of social media communication reflected in mainstream media 
agenda setting? Does it contribute to political equality in terms of representation in the 
mainstream press? This article answers these questions through a large-scale political claims 
analysis in 45 newspapers across 9 European countries. It comes to confirm the theoretical 
underpinnings laid out by scholars like Herman and Chomsky with their analysis of media 
agenda setting and power relations, or Chantal Mouffe and her notion of agonistic pluralism 
and the need to address unequal access to the public sphere. Overall, our findings suggest 
that young people in general, but even more so disadvantaged youth socio-economic groups 
still seem highly misrepresented in mainstream newspapers, and that the increasing 
prevalence of social media communication does not seem reflected in mainstream media 
agenda setting.  
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, young people in Europe have oftentimes been labelled as the “lost 
generation”, or as “the first generation in living memory that will be worse off than their 
parents”. They are faced with significant challenges, many of which have drastically 
heightened since the financial crisis, particularly in southern countries (Lima & Arties, 2013). 
These include - but are not limited to - high levels of youth unemployment, precarious work, 
lack of affordable housing, or poor access to education. This state of affairs and the alarming 
figures that illustrate it is often represented in the media either as a decomplexified 
phenomenon, byproduct of the financial crisis, or as the fate of an apathetic, depoliticised 
young population (Carpentier & Cammaerts, 2006). However, one ought to question not only 
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what young people have in their power to tackle these challenges and stereotypes, but also 
the extent to which young people - in all their diversity - are salient in the mainstream media 
and have the opportunity to voice their political claims. 
Authors like Herman and Chomsky (1988) have long theorized about the mainstream media 
and their editorial bias, maintaining that they have established a routine of privileging ‘elite’ 
sources, often linked to governments’ press offices, institutions or large companies. This 
eclipses different realities that deviate from the normalcy established by the elites’ hegemonic 
discourse, as well as severely limits conflict and diversity in the public sphere, which are 
essential for real democratic debate (Mouffe, 2005).  
More recently, with the advent of the Web 2.0 and the subsequent emergence and widespread 
adoption of social media, there have been hopes that young people - seen as ‘digital natives’ 
- would have the opportunity to progressively escape a condition of political inequality through 
the adoption of new communication technologies and strategies (Xenos et al., 2014), 
diversifying the public sphere and calling the gatekeeping role of the mainstream media into 
question. 
Today, based on these theoretical underpinnings and given the widely agreed-upon agenda-
setting influence of the mainstream media, it seems essential to once again address young 
people’s presence (or absence) in the media sphere as political actors, as well as the much-
debated potential of the internet and social media in alleviating a condition of political inequality 
that youth in general, but even more so specific socio-economic groups, have traditionally 
been subject to. 
This paper will do just that, by addressing the following questions: (i) to what extent does the 
mainstream media relay young people’s political claims? (ii) which youth socio-economic 
groups are more - or less - likely to have their political claims relayed by the mainstream 
media? (iii) to what extent is the growing prevalence of social media communication reflected 
in mainstream media agenda setting? 
Based on a large scale political claims analysis in 45 mainstream newspapers across 9 
European countries, our data show that youth political claims are few and far between (despite 
our reliance on youth-related keywords in the searches); that the mainstream media still lack 
the defining features of diversity as a significant majority of these youth political claims come 
from more educated and socially-included young people; and that optimism regarding the 
potential of social media in contributing to political equality in the public sphere does not seem 
justified, at least when it comes to the mainstream press. 
This article will start with a brief presentation of the theoretical framework, touching upon some 
of Herman and Chomsky’s statements about the filters and biases of the mainstream media, 
as well as Chantal Mouffe’s notion of ‘agonistic pluralism’. These conceptual approaches will 
be completed by a brief overview of the literature on the impact of ICTs and social media on 
the flow of information and on news sourcing practices. This will be followed by a 
methodological section presenting the data collection and exploitation. The last section of the 
article includes a presentation of our findings, followed by a discussion and concluding 
thoughts. 
Theoretical framework 
Previous works on mainstream media filters and biases provide an essential theoretical 
framework for analysing the salience of political claims from young people and disadvantaged 
youth socio-economic groups in the mainstream media. Drawing on Walter Lippmann’s 
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concept of ‘manufacturing consent’, Herman and Chomsky (1988) analysed the way in which 
the mainstream media constituted themselves as tools of establishment propaganda. The 
advent of the internet meant that their work had to be re-edited and re-contextualised (Goss, 
2013; Mullen, 2009; Mullen & Klaehn, 2010; Pedro, 2009; Zollmann, 2017), so that the bases 
of their critical reflection continue to be applicable today. It is particularly useful to look back 
at their five filters of editorial bias: the business structure, the dependence on advertising, the 
nature of the information sources, the external forms of control over content and the 
antagonistic logic with which reality is framed. For the purposes of this article, we will mostly 
dwell on their reflections on the sources of information and the antagonistic logic. 
Regarding the sources of information, Herman and Chomsky maintain that the mainstream 
media have established a routine of privileging information sources that are linked to 
governments’ press offices, institutions or large companies. Within this context, the actors that 
generate information outside these circuits are not considered as reliable sources and, 
therefore, their acts or claims are not recognized as newsworthy. The mainstream media have 
thus managed to give the impression that the veracity of information is directly linked to the 
status, power and prestige of the sources. 
Regarding the antagonistic logic diffused through the mainstream media, Herman and 
Chomsky describe the way in which the mass media eclipse those realities that do not 
correspond to the normalcy established by the elites’ hegemonic discourse. This means that 
the voices that do not fit the hegemonic standards of ‘normalcy’ or ‘correctness’ are silenced. 
The ‘others’, considered as anti-social or undesirable elements thus do not have the capacity 
of agency nor are represented in the mainstream media. In line with these claims, when 
looking at youth representation in the mainstream press, our findings point to a significant 
overrepresentation of young people who are more educated and socially included. 
As we look at the prominence of different youth socio-economic groups in the mainstream 
media, it is also interesting to consider the work of Chantal Mouffe, her notion of ‘agonistic 
pluralism’, and her arguments regarding the importance of diversity and confrontation in the 
public sphere. Chantal Mouffe (2005) moves away from the Habermasian conception of ‘public 
sphere’, according to which public debate culminates with consensus. She maintains that 
some level of conflict should be recognized as necessary for real democratic debate. Her 
notion of ‘agonistic pluralism’ precisely encapsulates this idea of diversity that is constantly 
confronting social reality. According to her, the capacity to enrich democracy lies in the ability 
of different identities and voices to recognize each other in diversity. Therefore, she questions 
the belief that the public sphere can only be based on consensus and on the need for people 
to put their particular interests aside, since this always implies that the terms in which this 
consensus is expressed are the result of the hegemonic character of dominant groups. This 
paper suggests the absence - when it comes to the mainstream press - of a space in which 
this idea of agonistic pluralism can flourish and in which differences can be confronted and 
contrasted, as our data suggest a significant lack of diversity in the mainstream media’s 
sources. 
Studying the extent to which non-hegemonic groups and their political claims are represented 
in the mainstream media seems all the more important when considering the agenda-setting 
influence of the mainstream media. Indeed, the power of the media and its ability to tell the 
world what is important are issues that have been - from the early 20th century onwards - 
widely described in agenda setting research (from Lippman in 1922 to McCombs and Shaw’s 
seminal article in 1972). In a well-known and compelling statement, Cohen (1963, p. 13) 
declared “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, 
but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about”. Later studies have 
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extensively revisited this claim, oftentimes making it more encompassing by arguing that the 
media are not only successful in telling people what to think about, but also in telling them how 
to think about it, and thus, by extension, what to think (Page & Shapiro, 1992; McCombs & 
Shaw, 1993). 
More recently, many have seen the development of the Web 2.0 as something that would 
reduce the power of the media and contribute to political equality in the public sphere. Indeed, 
the advent of the internet and social media have contributed to the increasing questioning of 
the role of the mainstream media in the configuration of the spaces through which information 
flows. The ‘post-digital era’, coined by some authors as ‘hyperdigital’ (Feixa et al., 2016) is, 
thus, characterised by the multiplication of discourses and information channels, as well as 
the increasing speed at which this information circulates. This ‘hyperconnectivity’ (Rovira 
Sancho, 2017) leads to greater complexity in the constitution of the public sphere, with 
information overload and new actors gaining weight in public debates.  
However, from a media studies perspective, there is a growing concern that the mainstream 
media - despite the advent of the Web 2.0 - has not fully grasped nor adapted to the shift from 
mass communication to digital communication. There have been several works on the ways 
in which social media and the internet have changed and are changing traditional journalism, 
as well as on the extent to which journalists rely on social media in their sourcing and 
information gathering practices. While a number of studies claim that social media and digital 
technologies more generally are changing the way news are sourced and produced as well 
as power relations in terms of who gets to say what (Newman, 2011; Hermida, 2013; Broersma 
& Graham, 2012; Chao-Chen, 2013), others suggest that the use and prominence of social 
media and digital technologies in the mainstream press remain very limited and that they are 
mostly used as a ‘backup’ for traditional sources (Van Leuven et al.,  2014; Tylor, 2015; Knight, 
2012; Machill & Beiler, 2009; Lariscy et al., 2009; Clua et al., 2018). The analysis carried out 
in this paper seems to support these last studies, suggesting that the growing prevalence of 
social media communication is not reflected in the productive routines of the mainstream 
newspapers analysed here, nor does it seem to contribute to political equality in terms of 
whose claims are relayed. 
Methodology 
This paper is based on a political claims analysis (Koopmans & Statham, 1999) in which we 
systematically studied - among other things - the actors intervening in public debates through 
mainstream media, the way their claims were raised, the issues that were raised, the policy 
positions and the frames that were advanced. In this study, the political claim was understood 
as a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal, in the public space made by a given 
actor on behalf of a group or collectivity, expressing a political opinion and bearing on the 
interests or rights of other groups or collectivities.  
For each country, five daily newspapers of national coverage were selected (45 in total). Only 
newspapers that fit the definition of Mainstream Media were included in the sample. All the 
newspapers had to be print newspapers of national coverage, with a high level of circulation 
and of generalist scope. The selection took into account the respective characteristics of each 
country’s media landscape and tried to find the best possible equilibrium across the ideological 
spectrum. 
We retrieved articles that were published between 2010 and 2016, and that included any or 
all of the following keywords (translated into 9 different languages): young people, 
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adolescent*, student*, youth. Within these parameters, the articles were randomly selected 
and political claims were identified and extracted through a systematised screening and coding 
process (for more information on methodology, see Euryka project, 2018). 
Each team retrieved around 100 political claims per newspaper, amounting to a total of 4525 
claims that were coded using a codebook. The codebook included - but was not limited to - 
variables such as the ‘actor(s)’ making the claim or the form through which the claim was 
made (i.e. the means of claim-making). A reliability test was performed on each variable of the 
study (Krippendorff, 2004). Results were above 0.70 on all the variables analysed in this paper 
(actor variable, 0.75; form variable, 0.95).  
In order to see the extent to which the mainstream press relayed the voice of young people, 
we focused on the actor variable, telling us - among other things - when the claim was made 
by a ‘youth actor’ (see Figure 1). This variable also gave us the number of claims that were 
made by different youth actors from different backgrounds and socio-economic groups (see 
Figure 2). To see the way in which the political claims of these different types of youth actors 
were made, we focused on the form variable, telling us, for example, when the relayed claim 
was made through a direct declaration to the media, a demonstrative protest action or through 
social media - among others (see Figure 3). 
Analysis and results 
This section will first present the data that illustrate the extent to which the mainstream press 
relays young people’s voice. Secondly, we will look at the proportion of political claims from 
different youth socio-economic groups in the mainstream press, before moving on to the 
means through which these youth claims were made and picked up by the mainstream 
newspapers in our sample. 
1. Young people’s voice in the mainstream press 
 
Despite the fact that political claims were coded only to the extent that they were about and/or 
made by young people, as well as the fact that the search terms used for retrieving the news 
articles were closely related to youth, we found that only 940 (20.8%) of the 4525 claims that 
appeared in the selected mainstream newspapers were made by young people (see Figure 
1). Therefore, more than three quarters (79.2%) of the claims - while having young people as 
objects of the claims - were made by non-youth actors. These included - among others - state 
actors and judiciary (36.5% of the 3585 claims made by non-youth actors), education 
stakeholders (school and university teachers and management - 16.2%), or political parties 
and groups (12.8%). 
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Figure 1. Number of political claims (n=4525) made by youth and non-youth actors 
 
2. Youth socio-economic groups relayed by the mainstream press 
 
In relation to the 20.8% of claims that were made by young people, the data analysis revealed 
significant disparities when it comes to the different youth actors or groups whose political 
claims were relayed by the selected mainstream newspapers (see Figure 2). This disparity is 
characterised by an overwhelming majority of students and members of youth branches of 
political parties, and a near-total absence of young people who could be characterised as 
unemployed, in poverty, or disabled - to name a few.  
Indeed, out of the 940 claims made by youth actors, 396 (42.1%) were made by higher (27.6%) 
or secondary (14.6%) education students or graduates, and 182 (19.4%) were made by 
members of youth branches of political parties. On the other hand, only 6 (0.6%) of the 940 
claims relayed by the newspapers in our sample were made by young people who could be 
characterised as being in poverty, suggesting a clear tendency of journalistic routines to favour 
young people who are more educated and socially included.  
Despite the fact that youth unemployment in the EU stood at 20.3% in 2015 and 18.7% in 
2016 (Eurostat, 2017), unemployed youth were the actors of only 0.8% of all the claims that 
were made by young people. On the other hand, higher and secondary education students or 
graduates and members of youth branches of political parties, taken together, were the actors 
of 61.5% of all the claims made by young people.  
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Figure 2. Number of political claims by different types of youth actors (n=940). 
 
3. Ways in which the youth claims were made 
 
Let us now go back to the question of how and if social media and digital technologies are 
changing the way news are sourced and produced, and look at the ways in which the youth 
claims were made. We found that while 325 (34.5%) of the 940 youth claims relayed by the 
mainstream press were made through interviews or direct declarations to the media, only 25 
(2.6%) were made through social media (see Figure 3), suggesting that the growing 
prevalence of social media communication is not reflected in the way the mainstream 
newspapers in our sample relayed these political claims. 
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Figure 3. Number of youth political claims (n=940) by forms of action 
 
 
Looking at the different youth actors of the claims that were made through interviews or 
declarations to the media, the disparity is no less striking. Indeed, almost half (45.2%) of the 
claims made through interviews or declarations to the media were made by students and 
graduates, while 23.1% were made by members of youth branches of political parties, 
representing together 68.3%. On the other hand, among the claims made through interviews 
or declarations to the media, only 3 (0.9%) were made by unemployed youth, 3 (0.9%) by 
social protest groups, and 2 (0.6%) by young people who could be characterised as being in 
poverty (see Figure 4). These figures once again support Herman and Chomsky’s claims 
regarding the mainstream media’s preference for ‘elite sources’, justify Chantal Mouffe’s 
concerns regarding diversity in the public sphere, as well as mirror apparent inequalities in 
terms of access to media representation. 
 
Figure 4. Number of interviews/declarations to the media (n=325) by different types of youth actors  
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Discussion and conclusion 
Throughout this article, we saw that: first, young people’s voice represents a minority and that 
young people still seem misrepresented in the European mainstream press. The low 
proportion (20.8%) of claims made by youth actors could partly be due to the fact that young 
people’s political activity increasingly takes place online, but that - as our data suggest - 
mainstream media seem reluctant to use social media sources. It also seems to support 
Herman and Chomsky’s assertion that the mainstream media have established a routine of 
privileging elite sources that are linked to governments’ press offices, institutions or large 
companies, at the expense of ‘non-hegemonic’ groups (in this case young people) and 
diversity.  
Second, social inequalities seem reflected in (and reproduced by) the mainstream media, as 
we observed a clear tendency of the newspapers in our sample to relay the voice of young 
people who are more educated and socially included, at the expense of disadvantaged youth 
groups and diversity. These findings relate back to Chantal Mouffe’s view on hegemonic 
relations and agonistic pluralism, as well as to Herman and Chomsky’s idea of the antagonistic 
logic of mainstream media discourses. They not only illustrate the absence (at least when it 
comes to the mainstream newspapers in our sample) of an arena in which this idea of agonistic 
pluralism can take place and in which differences can be confronted, but also mirror 
substantial inequalities in the representation of different youth socio-economic groups in the 
mainstream newspapers analysed here. Within the framework of this study, their ideas have 
formed a useful theoretical basis to analyse how and to what extent the mainstream media 
take into account different young political actors and relay their concerns. Despite the 
hypothetical greater role and protagonism that could be assigned to young people - and 
disadvantaged youth socio-economic groups - as political actors dealing closely with the last 
decade’s economic crisis (for example, in the face of worsening labour conditions), their voice 
- which is finding a place in digital culture and social media - still represents a minority and 
lack significance in the mainstream media. 
Third, our results also suggested that the prominence of social media in the mainstream press 
remain very limited and - despite early optimism - these online applications do not seem to 
contribute to political equality when it comes to mainstream media coverage and 
representation. The low salience of claims made through social media could imply - among 
other things - that traditional ways of reaching sources are not compromised by the growing 
prevalence of social media communication. While the new media have developed and spread 
rapidly, and even though many scholars have claimed that social media are transforming 
journalism, our data suggest that their growing prominence is not reflected in the mainstream 
newspapers analysed here. This finding could suggest that, so far, the long-predicted potential 
of the World Wide Web and social media in the democratisation of the public sphere has not 
materialised, at least when it comes to the mainstream newspapers analysed here. This point 
illustrates Herman and Chomsky’s idea of the mainstream media’s rigid understanding of news 
sourcing. On the one hand, it remains to be demonstrated that the mainstream media have 
incorporated social media and its actors as ‘serious’ sources of information. On the other hand, 
the fact that social media discourse is more porous to ‘non-hegemonic’ information makes 
them less attractive from the perspective of the established canons of newsworthiness. 
Although beyond the scope of this paper, the fact that no significant differences were found 
between newspapers of different editorial lines (e.g., between conservative and liberal 
newspapers) should encourage further research, not on the ideology of different news outlets 
but on the business models that govern them. To be able to make a leap forward in mapping 
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and understanding the mass media today, it would be necessary to take into consideration all 
the journalistic projects that, while not identifying with the mainstream press or depending on 
the interests of the establishment, have a wide circulation on digital platforms. 
Last but not least, this study is based on and limited to a content analysis of political claims 
found in newspaper articles. A more comprehensive study could go further and take into 
account what journalists themselves have to say about journalistic routines and the questions 
addressed in this article as well as how these mainstream media are run and function on a 
day-to-day basis.  
In light of this study, it is important to underline that one should not view the mainstream media 
as entities that are independent of the economic, political, social and historical context in which 
contents are legitimised and consensuses reached. The extent (if any) to which social media 
and ICTs can and do alleviate political inequalities, as well as alter power relations and the 
way discourse is articulated in the mainstream media (and in the public sphere) represents an 
important and challenging topic that is worth studying. 
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